By Daniel Bampoe
After more than 18 months of proceedings, the prosecution in the criminal trial involving former National Signals Bureau (NSB) Director-General Kwabena Adu-Boahene and his co-accused has closed its case, setting the stage for a major legal test over whether the accused persons have any case to answer.
The close of the Republic’s case came after the prosecution called four witnesses, with its fourth witness, Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) investigator Frank Marshall Cromwell, subjected to weeks of intense cross-examination by lead defence counsel Samuel Atta Akyea.
But as the prosecution brought its evidence to an end, the defence presented its own interpretation of the proceedings, arguing that the extensive testimony failed to establish several fundamental elements of the state’s allegations surrounding the disputed GH¢49.1 million.
At the centre of the prosecution’s case is the allegation that GH¢49.1 million belonging to the state was unlawfully moved from an account described by prosecutors as a “STATE BNC” account into a UMB account allegedly privately controlled by Adu-Boahene and his wife.
The prosecution has further alleged that the funds were subsequently used to acquire properties and luxury vehicles, including assets allegedly associated with locations such as London, Mayfair, Oyarifa, Kobby Keach Hotel and Dorchester Heights.
The defence, however, says the evidence presented during the trial paints a fundamentally different picture.
According to the defence’s assessment of the prosecution’s own witnesses, the state failed to establish the existence of a government agency or account formally known as “STATE BNC.”
Instead, the defence says evidence from both the NSB Head of Finance and the EOCO investigator established that the account from which the GH¢49.1 million originated was a National Security special operations account held at Fidelity Bank.
That distinction has become central to the defence’s argument because the prosecution’s characterization of the account as a conventional state account is being challenged against evidence concerning National Security’s special operational financial arrangements.
Who controlled the originating account?
Another issue the defence has highlighted is the question of who had authority over the Fidelity Bank account from which the disputed funds originated.
According to the defence, EOCO’s investigator testified that the account had three signatories: former National Security Coordinator Joshua Kyeremeh, Seth Danso, who was identified as Head of Finance in the Office of the National Security Coordinator, and Adu-Boahene.
The defence says the evidence further established that two signatures were required for withdrawals.
On that basis, the defence argues that Adu-Boahene could not have independently withdrawn or transferred the GH¢49.1 million from the account.
The defence has therefore challenged the prosecution’s characterization of the transaction as one in which Adu-Boahene simply took control of state funds and moved them at will.
The cheques and the National Security Coordinator
The three cheques representing the disputed GH¢49.1 million have also been subjected to extensive scrutiny.
According to the defence, the cheques were not solely signed by Adu-Boahene. Rather, they were signed by the then National Security Coordinator, Joshua Kyeremeh, with Adu-Boahene acting as co-signatory.
The NSB Head of Finance also testified that she prepared and wrote the cheques before they were presented for the required signatures.
The defence argues that these facts complicate the prosecution’s allegation that Adu-Boahene independently engineered the movement of the money.
Head of Finance deposited two cheques
Perhaps one of the more significant points highlighted by the defence concerns the role of the NSB’s own Head of Finance.
According to the defence’s account of the evidence, the prosecution’s investigator confirmed that the Head of Finance personally deposited two of the three cheques into the UMB account at the centre of the dispute.
The defence says the witness described the account as an operational account within the National Security environment, although she indicated that she did not have clearance to know all the details surrounding its operations.
That evidence, the defence argues, raises questions about the prosecution’s portrayal of the UMB account as simply a private account belonging to Adu-Boahene and his wife.
National Security operatives used the alleged private account
The defence has also drawn attention to evidence that National Security operatives conducted transactions through the UMB account.
According to the defence, EOCO’s investigator admitted that National Security personnel, including Gerald Osei Tutu and Denise Blackson, transacted on the account.
The defence further points to evidence that more than GH¢109 million was withdrawn from the account by National Security operatives for what it describes as special operations.
That evidence has prompted the defence to pose a central question: if the account was genuinely a private account controlled solely for the benefit of Adu-Boahene and his wife, why were National Security operatives using it for operational transactions?
The defence argues that the answer is critical to understanding the true nature of the account.
One account, four descriptions
Another issue that emerged during the trial was the different descriptions used for the UMB account.
According to the defence, the same account was variously described as the BNC Operations Account, Bureau of National Communications–Operations, BNC Ops and Private BNC.
The defence argues that the varying descriptions should not be confused with the existence of different accounts because the underlying account number remained the same.
It has also stressed that banking transactions are ultimately directed to account numbers rather than simply names appearing on cheques.
Where was the money supposed to go?
The defence says one of the most important unanswered questions concerns the alleged diversion itself.
During cross-examination, Cromwell was reportedly asked to identify the alternative account into which the GH¢49.1 million was originally supposed to have been paid.
According to the defence, the investigator could not identify such an account.
That response, the defence argues, creates a fundamental problem for the allegation of diversion because, in its view, the prosecution must establish where the money was supposed to go before it can demonstrate that it was diverted from that destination.
Was the UMB account really private?
The defence has also attacked the prosecution’s characterization of the UMB account as an unauthorized private account.
According to its assessment of the evidence, the EOCO investigator was unable to demonstrate that the account was improperly created or operated as a private account by Adu-Boahene and his wife.
The defence points to the involvement of the National Security Coordinator in signing the cheques deposited into the account and the subsequent use of the account by National Security operatives.
It further argues that the investigator did not interview Seth Danso, one of the signatories to the originating Fidelity Bank account, or members of the top National Security hierarchy before reaching some of his conclusions.
Mayfair evidence challenged
The defence has also challenged the prosecution’s attempt to link alleged Mayfair property payments to the GH¢49.1 million.
According to the defence, the investigator acknowledged that receipts relied upon in relation to Mayfair were dated 2016 and 2018, while the disputed GH¢49.1 million cheques came later.
The defence consequently argues that the chronology makes it impossible to establish, on the evidence presented, that those Mayfair payments were financed from the GH¢49.1 million.
No direct property or vehicle link, says defence
The defence has further claimed that the prosecution failed to produce title documents establishing that Adu-Boahene and his wife owned the properties allegedly attributed to them in Mayfair, Oyarifa, Kumasi and London in a manner that directly linked those properties to the disputed funds.
It similarly argues that the investigator did not demonstrate that any specific vehicle was purchased with the GH¢49.1 million.
The prosecution, however, has maintained that its case is supported by documentary evidence, including financial records, purchase documents and other materials, and that the court must assess the evidence as a whole.
The cyber-defence procurement question
Perhaps the most consequential issue remains the purpose of the GH¢49.1 million.
The defence says the prosecution’s own investigator could not establish that the entire amount was exclusively intended for the procurement of a cyber-defence system.
That question is particularly important because the cyber-defence procurement has been a central feature of the case from the outset.
The defence has maintained that the transactions must be understood within the context of National Security operations and has previously pointed to correspondence from the alleged supplier, ISC Holdings, concerning delivery of the cyber-defence equipment.
The prosecution disputes the defence’s characterization of the transactions and has continued to argue that the accused persons unlawfully dealt with government funds.
From prosecution evidence to no-case submission
With the Republic having now closed its case, the focus shifts to the next major legal stage.
The court has directed the defence to file its written submissions in support of its anticipated submission of no case to answer by September 25, 2026.
The court has subsequently adjourned the matter to November 5, 2026, when it is expected to rule on whether the prosecution has established sufficient evidence requiring the accused persons to enter a defence.
