BY ISSAH OLEGOR
The cocoa sector is facing renewed attention over the financial management of the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), following an international investigation that uncovered years of mounting debt, financial losses, procurement pressures and concerns over the transparency of the institution’s operations.
The investigation, led by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) under its China Capital project, examined millions of documents from the London branch and subsidiary of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).
A major issue emerging from the documents is COCOBOD’s long-standing dependence on borrowing to finance cocoa purchases and other operations. In November 2019, the Board secured a US$600 million syndicated loan from a consortium of lenders that included ICBC. The facility became a major financing arrangement for Ghana’s cocoa sector.
The pressure on the Board’s finances became more pronounced when Ghana implemented the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme (DDEP) in 2023. COCOBOD was among the state institutions affected by the restructuring. Documents reviewed in the investigation show an exposure of US$17.5 million as of September 30, 2023.
The restructuring also affected COCOBOD’s domestic cocoa bills. The Board restructured GH¢15.5 billion, equivalent at the time to about US$1.3 billion, in short-term local debt. Under the DDEP, the Bank of Ghana’s GH¢7.4 billion holdings in those bills took a 50 per cent haircut, while local banks held the remaining exposure.
More than 97 per cent of the bills were subsequently converted into term debt, with repayment spread over five years.
Lender correspondence reviewed in the investigation also shows that ICBC placed COCOBOD on a watchlist in February 2023 because of concerns about its financial condition. The bank monitored the Board’s debt obligations, cocoa production, shipments, loan repayments and restructuring of cocoa bills.
Dr Evans Kissi, a lecturer and researcher in sustainability management at the University of Kassel in Germany, described COCOBOD’s operations as lacking transparency and accountability, saying there was “a bit of opaqueness in the entire system.”
Lawyer and policy consultant Nicholas Opoku similarly pointed to weaknesses in the disclosure of cocoa-sector finances, particularly the calculation of prices, administrative deductions and debt-servicing costs.
Procurement has emerged as another area of concern. In June 2026, Deputy Finance Minister Thomas Ampem Nyarko told Parliament that the cocoa sector was under significant fiscal pressure because procurement commitments in previous crop seasons exceeded budgetary allocations.
He disclosed that COCOBOD had budgeted US$312.8 million for agrochemicals in the 2021–2022 crop year but procured about US$455.7 million worth. Between the 2023 and 2024 seasons, a budget of US$76.5 million was reportedly provided, while COCOBOD contracted approximately US$668.6 million worth of agrochemicals.
Ampem Nyarko questioned the procurement pattern because cocoa production was declining while spending on fertilisers and agrochemicals was increasing.
The financial reports examined also show a prolonged period of losses. COCOBOD recorded a profit of GH¢152.1 million in 2014/2015, the only profit identified in the eight annual reports covering the period analysed. The other years recorded losses, including GH¢1.09 billion, GH¢216.7 million, GH¢320.6 million, GH¢426.3 million and eventually GH¢2.44 billion in 2020/2021.
By September 2021, COCOBOD’s total equity had fallen from GH¢2.91 billion a year earlier to approximately GH¢14.3 million, according to the reports.
The Board remained heavily dependent on cocoa sales, which accounted for between 93 and 95 per cent of revenue, while direct costs consumed between 72 and 82 per cent of total expenditure in the years reviewed.
Borrowing increased substantially during the same period. COCOBOD’s total borrowings stood at approximately GH¢3.34 billion in 2014/2015, rose to GH¢8.37 billion by September 2018, reached GH¢12.48 billion by September 2020, and climbed to GH¢17.26 billion by September 2021. Finance costs increased from about GH¢494.6 million to GH¢1.74 billion over the period.
Part of that debt came through cocoa bills used to finance cocoa purchases. The instruments were periodically rolled over, with some carrying interest rates between 15 and 29 per cent. The structure meant that unpaid interest could add to the cost of financing over successive periods.
COCOBOD’s accounts also contain inconsistencies in the presentation of some financial figures. For 2016/2017, for example, the loss appears as GH¢394.851 million in one annual report, GH¢176.735 million in a later audited comparative statement and GH¢216.678 million in a financial highlights table.
The reports also alternated between consolidated and stand-alone accounts, making comparisons across years more difficult. Some figures were subsequently restated following changes in accounting treatment, including the classification of cocoa-road expenditure.
Cocoa-road financing provides another example of the financial pressures surrounding the Board. The investigation found that COCOBOD transferred US$150 million annually into a dedicated trust between 2014/2015 and 2016/2017 to settle contractor certificates. However, the trust deed was reportedly never executed, while unpaid contractor certificates reached approximately GH¢882.5 million.
In February 2026, the government directed the transfer of cocoa-road liabilities amounting to GH¢4.35 billion to the Ministry of Roads and Highways and the Ministry of Finance.
Despite the difficult financial history, COCOBOD recorded a dramatic improvement in 2026. A State Interests and Governance Authority report published on August 28, 2026, showed the Board moving from a reported GH¢5.73 billion loss to a GH¢5.11 billion profit. The improvement was attributed partly to exchange-rate movements and higher cocoa sales and prices.
According to the report, COCOBOD sold 628,996 metric tonnes of cocoa in 2024–2025, compared with 460,510 tonnes the previous year. The weighted average selling price rose from US$2,746 to US$5,174 per tonne, while the depreciation of the cedi increased the local-currency value of dollar-denominated cocoa sales.
