BY ISSAH OLEGOR
The High Court, Criminal Division 3, has dismissed an appeal brought by Naomi Manso, upholding her conviction and 18-year prison sentence for abetting robbery, while acknowledging that the trial court committed a procedural error by failing to expressly determine that a prima facie case had been established before calling on her to open her defence.
The decision, delivered by High Court Justice and law lecturer H/L Bertha Aniagyei in Naomi Manso v. The Republic [TLP-HC-2026-28], examined whether the procedural failure at the Ofaakor Circuit Court was serious enough to invalidate the conviction.
The High Court ultimately concluded that although the trial judge did not follow the legally prescribed sequence, the error did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice because an independent assessment of the evidence supported the finding that Manso had participated in the robbery through instigation.
Manso was convicted by the Ofaakor Circuit Court in June 2020 for abetting robbery contrary to sections 20(1) and 149 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29).
She was subsequently sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment.
The prosecution’s case was that Manso was involved in a plan with her boyfriend, Samuel Kwaku Nhyira, and two other persons, including PW4, to rob PW1, a man who had returned to Ghana from Italy.
According to the prosecution’s evidence, Manso went to the airport to collect PW1 in a taxi driven by Nhyira. The prosecution further relied on telephone records and other circumstantial evidence to establish a connection between Manso, Nhyira and PW4 shortly before the robbery.
PW1 was subsequently robbed at machete-point along an isolated bush route near Kasoa.
Manso, however, maintained that she was herself a victim during the incident and claimed that she had been assaulted and sexually violated by the perpetrators.
Appeal challenged both conviction and sentence
Dissatisfied with the Circuit Court’s decision, Manso appealed to the High Court on three principal grounds.
She argued that the judgment was not supported by the evidence on record, that the trial court had failed to properly evaluate her defence and that the 18-year sentence imposed on her was manifestly excessive.
A further ground had been reserved for possible additional grounds after the record of proceedings was received. However, because no additional grounds were filed, that ground was treated as abandoned.
The Republic did not file submissions opposing the appeal, leaving the High Court to determine the matter largely on the appellant’s arguments and the evidence contained in the record.
In challenging her conviction, Manso’s counsel argued that the prosecution had relied too heavily on telephone communication between Manso and Nhyira.
Counsel maintained that merely communicating with another person could not establish that Manso had intended to instigate a robbery.
The High Court agreed with the general proposition that telephone communication, standing alone, would not be enough to establish guilt.
However, the court said the communication could not be considered in isolation from the other evidence.
The court considered several circumstances together, including Manso’s relationship with Nhyira, her handing her phone to him shortly before a call was made to PW4, PW4’s subsequent presence along the isolated route where the robbery occurred, and inconsistencies in Manso’s account of the arrangements surrounding the trip.
The court also considered what it described as false claims concerning a hotel and taxi allegedly arranged by Manso’s sister, claims which the sister denied in court.
Her varying accounts to the police were also considered by the court.
Taken collectively, the High Court concluded that the circumstances constituted a chain of evidence pointing to Manso’s involvement in the planning of the robbery.
Hearsay objection rejected
Another major issue raised by the appellant concerned evidence attributed to PW4.
Counsel argued that portions of PW4’s evidence amounted to hearsay and ought not to have been admitted under sections 116 and 117 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323).
The High Court, however, rejected the argument on procedural grounds.
According to the court, counsel did not object when PW4’s witness statement was adopted in court. Instead, counsel proceeded to cross-examine the witness on the disputed portion.
The court therefore applied the principle established in Edward Nasser & Co Ltd v McVroom [1996-97] SCGLR 468, holding that the evidence had been admitted by implied agreement.
Consequently, the issue was no longer one of admissibility but rather the weigh Court examines Manso’s defence t that should be attached to the evidence.
Court examines Manso’s defence
The High Court also considered the appellant’s complaint that the trial judge had failed to properly evaluate her defence.
Counsel argued that the Circuit Court had not applied the established three-tier approach for assessing an accused person’s evidence and had failed to adequately explain why the prosecution’s case was preferred.
The High Court undertook its own examination of Manso’s various accounts.
The court identified inconsistencies between her complaint statement, two caution statements and her sworn testimony.
Among the matters considered were conflicting accounts concerning who had booked the hotel and who had arranged the taxi.
The court also noted that some of her claims were contradicted by evidence from her own sister.
Another factor considered was Manso’s failure to seek medical treatment after the alleged assault, despite an assurance that the cost of treatment would not be an obstacle.
The High Court concluded that her explanations were neither believable nor reasonably probable.
The court further held that the falsehoods it found in her testimony supported an inference of a guilty mind.
Manso had also challenged the trial judge’s treatment of her account that she had been raped during the robbery.
Her counsel argued that the trial judge had wrongly characterised her account by stating that she had been “beaten and had sex with” the robbers rather than properly recognising her allegation of rape.
The High Court did not find the description sufficient to establish that the trial judge had perversely evaluated her evidence.
According to the High Court, the language used by the trial judge substantially reflected words that Manso herself had used while giving evidence under oath.
The appellate court therefore declined to interfere with the finding on that basis.
Manso also argued that her sentence was excessive. Her lawyer relied on previous Court of Appeal decisions in which sentences imposed in robbery and narcotics-related cases had been reduced.
Counsel further described Manso as a first-time offender and a “good Samaritan” who deserved a more lenient sentence.
The High Court, however, found that the argument did not sufficiently identify specific mitigating circumstances that the trial judge had failed to consider.
The record showed that the trial court had considered the plea of allocutus before imposing sentence. The High Court also took into account the statutory framework governing robbery.
