EOCO Investigator Admits Key Checks Were Never Done Before GH¢49.1m ‘Diversion’ Conclusion In Adu-Boahene Case  

By Daniel Bampoe 

Fresh questions have emerged over the scope of the Economic and Organised Crime Office’s investigation into the alleged diversion of GH¢49.1 million involving former National Signals Bureau (NSB) Director-General Kwabena Adu-Boahene, after the prosecution’s lead investigator admitted under cross-examination that he did not examine a number of government budget, expenditure and audit records before reaching conclusions about the disputed funds.

Frank Marshall Cromwell, an EOCO investigator and the prosecution’s fourth witness (PW4), made the admissions during another round of intensive cross-examination led by Adu-Boahene’s lead counsel, Samuel Atta Akyea, as the defence continued its attempt to challenge the foundation of the state’s case.

The latest proceedings centred largely on a fundamental question that has followed the trial for months: Where exactly did the GH¢49.1 million come from, what was it officially intended for, and on what documentary basis did EOCO conclude that it had been diverted?

Cromwell’s answers, according to the proceedings referenced by the defence, revealed that several potentially relevant public financial management records were not examined as part of his investigation.

Investigator Did Not Examine 2020 National Budget

Under questioning, Cromwell acknowledged that he did not examine the Government of Ghana’s approved 2020 Budget before reaching his conclusions concerning the GH¢49.1 million.

The admission became important because the defence has consistently disputed the prosecution’s account of the origin and purpose of the money.

Atta Akyea sought to establish whether investigators had traced the funds through the government’s budgetary system before concluding that they had been unlawfully diverted.

Cromwell further testified that he did not verify whether the then Bureau of National Communications (BNC) had a specific GH¢49.1 million allocation in the national budget.

Neither, according to his testimony, did he establish whether the Office of the National Security Coordinator had received a budgetary allocation corresponding to the disputed amount.

No Cyber Defence Budget Verification

The questioning then moved to the cyber defence system that has occupied a central position in the prosecution’s case.

Cromwell acknowledged that his investigation did not establish whether Parliament had approved a specific budgetary provision for the cyber defence system.

The defence considers that omission significant because the prosecution has linked the disputed funds to the procurement of the system.

However, whether the absence of those investigative steps undermines the criminal charges remains a matter for the trial court to determine after considering the totality of the prosecution and defence evidence.

No Release Warrants Or Expenditure Authorisations Examined

Cromwell was also questioned about documents that could potentially establish how government funds were authorised and released.

According to his testimony, he did not examine release warrants, expenditure authorisations or other budgetary documentation demonstrating the formal release of the GH¢49.1 million.

The defence argues that such records could be important in determining the source, purpose and authorised destination of the funds before any conclusion about diversion could properly be reached.

Investigator Did Not Trace Funds Through GIFMIS

Another significant admission concerned the Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information System (GIFMIS), through which government financial transactions and expenditure are ordinarily managed and recorded.

Cromwell testified that he did not interrogate GIFMIS to establish the source or movement of the GH¢49.1 million.

He further conceded that he could not demonstrate that the account referred to during proceedings as the Director BNC Account was captured on the GIFMIS platform.

That evidence has provided another opening for the defence, which has questioned the prosecution’s characterization of the accounts involved in the transactions.

No Auditor-General Report Produced

Atta Akyea also pressed the EOCO investigator on whether an Auditor-General’s report existed identifying the alleged GH¢49.1 million diversion or misappropriation.

Cromwell could not produce such a report.

According to the evidence highlighted by the defence, the witness acknowledged that accounts of security and intelligence agencies opened through the Controller and Accountant-General are subject to audit, but he could not identify an Auditor-General’s report concerning the Director BNC Account that established the alleged diversion.

The absence of such a report does not by itself determine whether a criminal offence occurred, but the defence is relying on the admission to challenge the investigative foundation upon which the prosecution’s allegations were constructed.

Questions Over Fidelity Bank Account

The proceedings also returned to the Coordinator’s Account-NSC at Fidelity Bank, which has featured prominently throughout the trial.

Cromwell reportedly testified that he did not encounter documentation showing that the account was opened by the Controller and Accountant-General in the manner applicable to public accounts.

At the same time, the witness acknowledged that the Director BNC Account was sanctioned by the National Security Coordinator and was a special operations account.

The defence believes this distinction is crucial to determining the character of the disputed funds and the operational arrangements under which the accounts were maintained.

It also feeds into the defence’s broader argument that conventional public-sector accounting procedures cannot automatically be applied to classified National Security operations without examining the special financial structures under which intelligence operations function.

Investigator Questioned On Intelligence Financing

Perhaps one of the broader issues to emerge from the cross-examination concerned Cromwell’s familiarity with specialised intelligence financing.

The defence questioned him extensively about National Security financing arrangements, including confidential or clandestine operations, special-purpose funding structures, front companies and other mechanisms that may be employed for sensitive intelligence activities.

According to the defence’s account of the proceedings, Cromwell’s responses demonstrated limited knowledge of some of those specialised financing mechanisms.

Atta Akyea is expected to rely on that testimony to question whether EOCO sufficiently understood the operational environment within which some of the disputed transactions occurred before drawing conclusions of criminal wrongdoing.

Source of GH¢49.1m Remains Major Battlefield

The latest testimony assumes greater significance against the background of an earlier Court of Appeal disclosure order directing the Republic to provide information concerning the source of the GH¢49.1 million.

The appellate court also ordered disclosure of documents connected to National Security special operations accounts, correspondence relating to confidential operational arrangements and the file compiled by the late National Security Coordinator Joshua Kyeremeh concerning the acquisition of the cyber defence system.

The source, purpose and movement of the GH¢49.1 million have consequently become some of the most contested issues in the entire trial.

Background To Prosecution

The Attorney-General’s case against Adu-Boahene originated from investigations into the movement of GH¢49.1 million connected to National Security and the procurement of a cyber defence system.

The prosecution maintains that public funds were unlawfully diverted through accounts associated with Adu-Boahene and related entities and subsequently used for purposes other than those for which they were intended.

Adu-Boahene and his co-accused have denied wrongdoing.

The defence has instead sought to demonstrate that the transactions occurred within a specialised National Security operational structure and that accounts portrayed by prosecutors as private were used for security operations.

Earlier prosecution witnesses have also faced extensive cross-examination concerning the authorization of cheques, the operation of BNC-related accounts, payments connected to the Israeli cyber defence supplier and the alleged pre-financing of National Security activities.

Cromwell Faces Crucial Test

Cromwell’s appearance has been particularly anticipated because, as EOCO’s lead investigator, he is expected to provide the evidential bridge connecting the various banking transactions, companies, properties and National Security operations relied upon by prosecutors.

The Attorney-General had previously pointed to the investigator’s eventual testimony as important to understanding the state’s case.

Atta Akyea, on the other hand, has repeatedly indicated that the investigator would face vigorous cross-examination over how EOCO arrived at its conclusions.

The latest admissions therefore represent another important stage in that confrontation.

The prosecution still bears the burden of proving the criminal charges beyond reasonable doubt, while the defence is entitled to challenge the methodology, conclusions and reliability of the investigation.

Ultimately, whether the investigative omissions identified during cross-examination materially weaken the prosecution’s case will be determined by the trial judge after all the evidence has been presented and tested in court.

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