When the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) published its 2025 financials, the numbers appeared impressive and, at first glance, reassuring.
The newly created state agency reported that it had assayed 103.8 metric tonnes of artisanal and small-scale (ASM) gold valued at $10.8 billion, alongside 101 metric tonnes from large-scale mining valued at $9.7 billion.
By the close of the year, it posted a surplus exceeding GH¢5.4 billion—an outcome that suggested a strong start for a new institution mandated to reshape Ghana’s gold economy.
Established under the Ghana Gold Board Act, 2025 (Act 1140), GoldBod was designed to replace the Precious Minerals Marketing Company (PMMC), but with broader authority. Its mandate extended beyond trading to include regulation, export control, value addition, support for responsible mining, and the strategic accumulation of gold reserves for the Bank of Ghana.
Crucially, the law granted it monopoly powers as the sole exporter of gold in Ghana—a move intended to consolidate oversight and boost foreign exchange inflows.
However, a closer examination of GoldBod’s success story alongside the Bank of Ghana’s 2025 financial statements reveals a far more complex and troubling picture—one in which the central bank absorbed the cost of a programme that made GoldBod appear profitable.
Although GoldBod reported a surplus, the same gold purchasing programme contributed to a staggering GH¢9.05 billion net loss for the central bank, worsening its already fragile financial position. The divergence in outcomes stems largely from how the programme was structured and funded throughout 2025.
GoldBod was originally intended to operate using a $279 million revolving fund allocated in the national budget, enabling it to independently purchase and trade gold. But that funding only became available in December 2025. For most of the year, GoldBod functioned not as an independent trader, but as an intermediary—procuring gold on behalf of the Bank of Ghana using central bank funds, while charging fees for its services.
This meant that while GoldBod earned revenues through service charges and assay fees, the Bank of Ghana bore the full financial risk, including price fluctuations, currency mismatches, and trading losses. The result was two sharply contrasting financial outcomes from the same programme.
Concerns about this structure were raised early by the International Monetary Fund. In its fifth review of Ghana’s economic programme, the IMF disclosed that losses from artisanal gold transactions had already reached $214 million by September 2025. The Fund cautioned that such losses posed risks to the central bank’s financial sustainability and explicitly warned that they should not be borne by the Bank of Ghana.
The roots of the problem, however, predate GoldBod. The arrangement mirrors an earlier system used under the now-defunct gold-for-oil programme, which was discontinued in March 2025 after recording a cumulative loss of GH¢2.14 billion between 2023 and 2024. Under that system, the Bank of Ghana supplied foreign exchange at official rates to purchase gold, while miners were paid at higher, parallel market rates—creating an inherent pricing gap.
This structural imbalance persisted under GoldBod. The central bank effectively bought gold at a premium—reflecting higher unofficial exchange rates—while selling at a discount on international markets due to refining costs, transport, and other adjustments. On top of that, GoldBod charged fees on each transaction, including ad valorem and assay fees.
In practical terms, the Bank of Ghana was consistently paying more to acquire gold than it could recover from its sale, while also covering transaction costs. The losses were therefore embedded in the system from the outset.
Data from 2025 illustrates the scale of the imbalance. In October of that year, when global gold prices averaged $4,054 per ounce, Ghana realised only $3,919 per ounce—a shortfall of $135 per ounce. As volumes increased significantly—from 56 tonnes to 111 tonnes—the cumulative losses deepened.
When the Bank of Ghana eventually published its audited accounts, the full extent of the impact became clear. The Domestic Gold Purchase Programme recorded a net loss of GH¢9.05 billion. However, underlying figures revealed a much larger gross loss of GH¢21.89 billion on doré gold transactions, equivalent to roughly $2 billion.
While part of this loss was offset by a GH¢5 billion government intervention and GH¢7.9 billion in gains from gold bullion sales, the central bank’s balance sheet still took a significant hit. Meanwhile, GoldBod’s financials remained largely insulated, with approximately 82 percent of its revenue—excluding government grants—coming directly from fees paid by the Bank of Ghana.
The core issue lies in the exchange rate differential highlighted by policymakers.
The Bank supplied dollars to GoldBod at official rates, but purchases in the field were conducted at higher market rates, as miners refused to sell at the official rate. This meant the central bank effectively paid more for less gold in every transaction.
As the cedi strengthened, the paradox worsened. The gap between official and market rates widened, increasing the cost burden on the central bank even as headline economic indicators appeared to improve.
Looking ahead, authorities have indicated that GoldBod will fully assume responsibility for gold purchasing and trading operations from 2026, ending its intermediary role. This shift is expected to relieve pressure on the Bank of Ghana’s balance sheet.
However, analysts warn that without structural reforms—particularly in pricing mechanisms, exchange rate alignment, and transaction costs—the financial risks could simply shift from the central bank to GoldBod itself.
There are also calls to reconsider the practice of paying above-market prices to discourage smuggling, with suggestions that enforcement measures, rather than price distortions, should be used to address illegal trade.
Ultimately, while GoldBod’s financial results suggest a successful first year, the broader economic reality is more nuanced. The programme delivered increased gold exports and foreign exchange inflows, but at a significant cost to the central bank—costs that may ultimately be borne by taxpayers.
The contrast between GoldBod’s surplus and the Bank of Ghana’s losses underscores a central policy challenge: how to design a resource-backed strategy that generates national value without shifting hidden financial burdens within the system.
