By Grace Zigah
The Member of Parliament for Tano North, Dr Gideon Boako has raised questions about the growing dependence on gold as a major source of foreign exchange, arguing that recent movements in the cedi and the country’s external position provide an important test of the new economic architecture built around GoldBod.
In the latest edition of his Gboako Economic Digest, titled “When the Gold Engine Stutters: What Ghana’s Cedi and Reserves Are Telling Us About the New Economic Architecture,” Dr Boako examines how Ghana’s gold strategy has evolved since the 2022 economic crisis and whether the new model can provide sustainable foreign-exchange support without recreating the financial risks associated with the previous arrangement.
For much of 2025, Ghana’s economic narrative was dominated by falling inflation, cedi appreciation, improved fiscal conditions and stronger external buffers. Dr Boako argues, however, that the developments of 2026 require a closer examination of what is driving that stability and how durable it is.
From the 2022 crisis to the gold strategy
Dr. Boako traces the present framework to the economic crisis of 2022, when pressure on the cedi, inflation, public finances and external buffers forced policymakers to explore new ways of strengthening Ghana’s foreign-exchange position.
A central component was the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP), under which the Bank of Ghana purchased domestically produced gold in cedis and subsequently used gold and foreign-exchange flows to support the country’s external position.
The strategy became increasingly important as Ghana sought to make greater use of its domestic gold production.
The IMF has reported that the DGPP facilitated the export of US$10.9 billion worth of artisanal gold in 2025, equivalent to about 9.5 percent of GDP. However, the programme also generated substantial financial losses.
The IMF estimates that DGPP-related losses reached approximately $1.7billion (GH¢22 billion), equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP, in 2025. The experience raised concerns about the extent to which the central bank should carry the financial risks associated with what was essentially a large-scale commercial gold-purchasing operation.
For Dr Boako, the lesson was not that Ghana should abandon gold, but that the institutional structure for managing the strategy needed to change.
GoldBod takes over
That change came in July 2026, when GoldBod assumed responsibility for domestic gold purchases while the Bank of Ghana moved away from financing the programme through its balance sheet.
The IMF says the reform was designed to eliminate the central bank’s exposure to incremental quasi-fiscal risks associated with the gold-purchasing programme.
GoldBod now increasingly relies on commercial banks and private off-takers to finance its operations.
Dr Boako views the shift as an important institutional development because it separates monetary policy from commercial gold-purchasing activities. But he argues that the new arrangement creates another issue: financing capacity.
The question is whether GoldBod can mobilise sufficient financing consistently enough to purchase domestic gold at scale and convert those purchases into reliable foreign-exchange flows.
The new Gold–FX mechanism
Dr Boako describes the emerging model as a Gold–FX–Reserve triangle.
The basic transmission mechanism is:
Domestic gold → GoldBod purchases → gold exports → foreign exchange → commercial banks/reserves → cedi stability.
If the mechanism operates efficiently, gold purchases support exports, exports generate foreign exchange, and those foreign-exchange proceeds provide liquidity to the financial system while supporting Ghana’s external buffers.
According to Dr Boako, GoldBod reported generating US$1.315 billion in foreign exchange during its first full month under the new financing model. About US$668 million was sold directly to commercial banks, while approximately US$647 million was reportedly made available to the Bank of Ghana for reserve accumulation.
He cautions, however, that a strong initial performance cannot by itself establish the long-term resilience of the model.
The real test will be whether the system can continue mobilising financing and foreign exchange when market conditions become less favourable.
Where the vulnerability lies
Dr Boako argues that GoldBod is increasingly becoming more than a conventional gold-sector institution.
Because its activities now have a direct bearing on foreign-exchange liquidity and the country’s external position, its operational performance has wider macroeconomic implications.
If financing becomes constrained, gold production falls, export arrangements are disrupted or the cost of financing rises, the impact could extend beyond GoldBod itself.
This is why Dr Boako believes the new architecture must ultimately be judged by its resilience rather than its performance during favourable conditions.
He poses the broader question: What is Ghana’s gold-backed stability resilience strategy?
The fiscal risk has changed shape
Another concern raised by Dr Boako is the location of the financial risk.
Moving gold-purchase financing away from the Bank of Ghana does not necessarily eliminate the underlying economic cost. Instead, it changes where the exposure is carried.
Under the former system, some of the financial burden appeared on the central bank’s balance sheet. Under the new arrangement, greater responsibility falls on GoldBod and the broader public-sector framework surrounding it.
Dr Boako argues that this could be institutionally healthier because fiscal costs should be transparent and subject to appropriate scrutiny.
But he says Ghana must ensure that risks are not simply transferred from one public institution to another.
That makes questions about GoldBod’s operating economics increasingly important: how much it pays for gold, its financing costs, operating expenses, export margins, foreign-exchange generation and who ultimately bears the risk if market conditions deteriorate.
